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trade, must be aware that military deployments are necessary in an emergency
to protect our interests, for example, when it comes to trade routes, for example,
[sic] when it comes to preventing regional instabilities that could negatively
inuence our trade, jobs and incomes.
Horst K ohler, former President of Germany (NY Times, May 31, 2010)
1 Introduction
It is unusual for prominent public ocials like the former President of Germany to make
such seemingly politically incorrect statements. Military deployments for the protection of a
country's own interest and trade routes|instead of, say, the protection of human rights and
the promotion of democracy|perhaps sound too crass and cynical for today's international
norms. Although Dr. K ohler was forced to resign from the Presidency of Germany for
uttering the words quoted above, he did not ultimately disavow his essential belief in them.
For economists it would not appear to be controversial to state that the defense expen-
ditures of countries are related to their perceived interests, including maintaining access
to resources that might be in dispute, given that the international system is essentially
anarchic without the third-party enforcement that usually exists within individual states.
After all, as amply demonstrated in Findlay's and O'Rourke's (2007) overview of Eurasia's
economic history, military competition for resources and the expansion of world trade were
inextricably linked over the whole of the past millennium. While interstate wars have be-
come less common in the post-World War II period than they had been in the thirty years
prior to that, there have been both enough of them and, more seriously, enough disputes to
keep almost all countries armed. Examples of hot disputes in the postwar period include
the Suez Canal crisis in the 1950s, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait that resulted in the rst Gulf
war in the early 1990s, and the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. Numerous
other disputes|from that over the Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China Sea,
to disputes over water (e.g. owing through rivers like the Nile and the Brahmaputra),
to those that might involve oil, minerals, or simply land|might have not resulted in hot
incidents; however, they keep the militaries of almost all countries busy.1 The direct and
indirect costs of such disputes are large. For example, the latest estimates of the costs of the
Iraq and Afghanistan wars to the United States are around 4 to 6 trillion dollars (Stiglitz
and Bilmes, 2011).2
1See, Klare (2001), for an overview and many examples.
2Military expenditures alone were about 2.6 percent of world GDP during 2004, varying from less than
1 percent for a few countries to more than 10 percent for Saudi Arabia (SIPRI, 2005). As for the overall
costs of conict (including civil war), Blomberg and Hess (2011) estimate a lower bound for the yearly cost
of conict of 9 percent of steady state consumption for the 1950 to 2004 period. For high-income countriesGiven the quantitative importance of security costs in reality and their absence in canon-
ical models of trade, the question arises whether the major results of trade theory are robust
to the presence of insecurity. There are two fundamental propositions of neoclassical trade
theory that concern us here. First, for small countries (i.e., those that have no inuence on
world prices), free trade is superior to autarky. Second, a country's comparative advantage
is determined by the interplay of its factor endowments, technologies, and world prices.
In this paper we examine the robustness of these two major results by augmenting the
canonical 222 Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model of trade to allow for insecurity and its
accompanying costs. The neoclassical model (which we also call the \Nirvana" model, to
use Demsetz's (1969) apt term) is a limiting case of our model when security is costless
and perfect. We nd that the two main results of traditional trade theory are no longer
generally true, and we characterize and interpret the conditions under which they do and
do not hold.
In our model, one factor of production (\labor") is perfectly secure, while the other
(\land") is, in part, insecure. The distribution of insecure land between the two countries
depends on the relative amount of arming by each. Arming itself is produced with the
two factors of production and the cost of its production represents security costs. A novel
feature of this framework is that it captures the trade-regime dependence of the net marginal
benet of arming and thus of the incentive to arm. With arming endogenous, the factor
endowments left over for use in civilian production of the two nal goods are also endogenous
and depend on the trade regime prevailing in the two countries. Thus, both security costs
and the factor endowments used in civilian production are endogenous to the prevailing
trade regime. The two trade regimes we consider and compare are autarky and free trade.
Our comparison of welfare under these two regimes reveals that the relative factor
intensities of the two civilian goods play an important role. For example, when the countries
are identical and they both import the land-intensive good under free trade, then free trade
is superior to autarky for both countries. When they both export the land-intensive good,
however, and the price of that good is not too high, both countries prefer autarky. In the
rst case, free trade reduces the incentive to arm and thus the security costs relative to
autarky, because the land-intensive good can be obtained more cheaply in world markets
than it could be produced domestically under autarky. Therefore, free trade is better due
to both the traditional gains from trade and the lower costs of security. In the second case,
though, when the land-intensive good is exported, the higher export price compared to the
price of the good under autarky makes competition over land more intense, increasing the
like the United States and France the cost was roughly 4.5 percent of consumption, whereas for Iraq and
Iran, largely as a result of the war between then, it was nearly 77 percent and 16 percent of their respective
yearly consumptions.
2costs of security enough relative to autarky so as to outweigh the gains from trade.
In general, the security costs under the two trading regimes considered can be very
dierent. Under autarky they depend on the domestic factor and goods prices of both
countries, whereas under free trade the costs of security tend to be equalized because of
factor price equalization. Autarky can be preferable for one or both countries when free
trade involves higher added security costs relative to the gains from trade.
We also show how insecurity induces distortions in comparative advantage in at least two
possible ways: (i) by causing trade patterns to dier from the ones that would have emerged
under Nirvana; and, (ii) by altering the information content of the dierence between free-
trade and autarkic prices, and thus possibly leading to erroneous predictions of the direction
of trade ows. If, for example, the technology for arming is suciently intensive in the use of
the perfectly secure resource (labor), then insecurity implies relatively less of that resource
is left for the production of traded goods. Consequently, the world price of the consumption
good employing the secure resource intensively that implies no trade tends to exceed the
analogous price that would have prevailed under Nirvana. The net eect is that there exists
a range of world prices for which a country is an importer of that consumption good when
there is insecurity, whereas it would have been an exporter of the same good under Nirvana.
Similarly, because the introduction of free trade in consumption goods alters product and
factor prices, arming incentives along with the mix of resources absorbed in arming, and thus
the resources left for the production of consumption goods, a country's true comparative
advantage (given insecurity) can dier from that which is implied by a simple comparison
of autarkic prices to world prices. Both of these distortions imply that the presence of
insecurity plays an important role in the determination of a country's actual trade patterns
that traditional theory and empirical work fail to capture.
Our substantive characterization results do not depend on specic functional forms of
production or utility functions. The resulting generalized treatment sets the stage for both
applications of the augmented canonical trade model that allows for insecure property rights
and numerous extensions that include the case of large countries, which is of great relevance
to the elds of international relations and international political economy for studying the
relationship between trade and security policies at the global level.
This paper's contribution is related to literatures in both political science and economics.
Political scientists have long been interested in the linkages between international trade and
conict.3 Economists, by contrast, have only begun to explore these linkages. Examples
3See Barbieri and Schneider (1999), who survey much of the theoretical and empirical literatures on the
subject. Many of the analyses, in contrast to ours, emphasize the aggregate income eects of trade, with
the gains of trade reected in higher incomes that tend to amplify incentives to arm. Rowe (1999, 2005) is,
to our knowledge, the sole political scientist who emphasizes the role of factor endowments. Although he
does so in a qualitative fashion (focusing on military costs, while eectively abstracting from the potential
3include Anderson and Marcouiller (2005) and Anderton et al. (1999), who analyze Ricardian
models in which traded goods are insecure either because of the presence of pirates and
bandits or because the contending sides inuence the terms of trade through arming. Both
approaches emphasize the important, though basic, point that international trade can be
hampered by the anarchic nature of international relations. Skaperdas and Syropoulos
(2001, 2002) address some of the implications of insecure property in the context of simple
exchange models. Acemoglu et. al. (2011) explore the implications for intertemporal pricing
and exhaustion of a contested resource in a dynamic setting.
While extant trade theory has ruled out security problems by assumption, there are some
exceptions that focus on the related problem of open-access resources. Chichilnisky (1994)
argues that trade can reduce welfare in the South by accentuating the over-exploitation
of an open-access resource in which it has a comparative advantage, and Brander and
Taylor (1997a) formally prove this idea. Hotte et al. (2000) also study the eects of trade
in an open-access resource and extend the analysis to consider the evolution of private
enforcement in dynamic environments. Margolis and Shogren (2002) consider a North-
South trade model with enclosures. The key dierence between these models and ours is
that enforcement costs are due to active contestation of resources. There are also important
dierences in the models considered and most of the questions addressed.
In the next section, we present the formal model and a preliminary analysis that proves
useful in subsequent sections. Then, in Section 3, we investigate optimal security policies
under autarky and free trade. In Section 4, we explore the implications of international
conict for trade patterns and trade volumes. In Section 5, we compare autarky and free
trade in terms of their implications for security costs and welfare. Lastly, in Section 6, we
oer several concluding comments. All technical arguments and proofs have been relegated
to the Appendix.
2 Framework and Preliminary Analysis
Consider a global economy that consists of two countries, indexed by i = 1;2, and the
rest of the world (ROW), which for simplicity is treated as a single entity and taken as
exogenous. Each country can produce two consumption goods (say \butter" and \oil"),
indexed by j = 1;2, using labor and land under constant returns to scale. In the spirit
of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) trade model and as a benchmark, we assume
the countries have access to the same production technology; consumers have identical
and homothetic preferences dened over the two consumption goods; and, all markets are
benets of security policies), his analysis of how globalization in the late 1800s and early 1900s set the stage
for World War I points to the importance of the mechanism highlighted in our study|namely, the link
between product and factor prices that determines the costs of security.
4perfectly competitive. Each country i possesses Li units of secure labor and Ki units of
secure land. However, departing from the HOS trade model, we assume there exists an
additional K0 units of land. (Of course, what we call land (K) could also be interpreted
as a natural resource (e.g., oil, water) or simply physical capital.) Although this additional
land is divisible, its division between the two countries is subject to dispute. Policymakers
use arming to gain control of the disputed resource, with the ultimate goal of maximizing
national welfare.
Let country i's \guns" be denoted by Gi, a variable most accurately viewed as a pro-
ducible composite good that reects country i's military capability. Country i's share of










i=1;2 Gi = 0;
(1)
for i = 1;2 (j 6= i), where f()  0, f(0) = 0, f0() > 0, limGi!0 f0(Gi) = 1, and
f00()  0.4 According to (1), the fraction of the disputed resource a country secures in
the contest depends on its own guns as well as those of its adversary. Specically, it is
increasing in the country's own guns (i
Gi  @i=@Gi > 0) and decreasing in the guns
of its adversary (i
Gj  @i=@Gj < 0, j 6= i). The inuence of guns on a country's share,
i(Gi;Gj), could be taken literally or viewed as the reduced form of a bargaining process, in
which relative arming gures prominently in the division of the contested resource.5 In any
case, each country has an incentive to produce guns, whereby it can obtain a larger share
of the contested land and thus more income. But, there is an opportunity cost of doing
so|namely, the loss in income due to the diversion of resources away from the production
of consumption goods. This trade-o, which is trade-regime dependent, plays a prominent
role in the determination of the countries' security policies.6
4In the Appendix we derive some useful properties of this specication. As revealed in the Supplementary
Appendix (available from the authors upon request), the condition that limGi!0 f
0(G
i) = 1 and the assumed
concavity of f() help establish existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the interior of the strategy space.
See Skaperdas (1996) for an axiomatization of (1), requiring only that f() is a non-negative, increasing
function. One functional form for f() that has been widely used in the rent-seeking literature, as well as in
the literatures on tournaments and conict, is f(G) = G
 where  2 (0;1] (Tullock, 1980). See Hirshleifer
(1989) for a comparison of the properties of this form with those of f(G) = e
G. As noted below, employing
alternative specications for 
i(G
i;G
j) that allow for either non-additivity or asymmetry would not change
the results to follow. For a more general analysis of the comparative static results of conict, see Acemoglu
and Jensen (2011).
5See Anbarci et al. (2002) for an analysis of this issue and how, in particular, dierent bargaining solution
concepts lead to division rules that vary in their sensitivity to guns.
6While countries often build their own militaries, they can, in practice, also buy or sell certain weapons
in the world market, as well as hire mercenaries or foreign security experts. The analysis could easily be
extended to allow for the international trade of guns. In particular, viewing \guns" as a composite good
produced according to a linearly homogenous function with weapons and soldiers as its arguments, the link
between product (and arms) prices and factor prices would remain, so that our main insights would go
5The setting here is an anarchic one, so that writing enforceable (binding) contracts on
the proliferation of arms and the division of K0 is not possible. Instead, we view guns as
the \enforcement" variable that determines each country's share of the contested resource
that, in turn, can be combined with the country's remaining secure endowments of labor
and land employed in the production of nal consumption goods. Accordingly, the sequence
of events is as follows:
(i) Given the initial distribution of secure factor endowments (Li and Ki), the two coun-
tries (i = 1;2) simultaneously choose their production of guns Gi.
(ii) Once these choices are made, the contested land is divided according to (1): each
country i receives iK0 units of the contested resource.
(iii) With the quantities of land and labor left for the production of consumption goods
having thus been determined, private production and consumption decisions take
place. Under autarky, prices adjust to clear domestic markets. Under free trade, the
prices of consumption goods are xed in the world market.
A conictual equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium in guns, conditional on the prevailing
trade regime.
To complete the basic model, we now specify the supply and demand sides of each
economy. Starting with the supply side, let  i   (wi;ri) and ci
j  cj(wi;ri) represent
respectively the unit cost functions of guns and goods j = 1;2 in country i, where wi and
ri denote competitively determined factor prices|respectively, the wage paid to labor and
the rental rate paid to landowners. These unit cost functions have the usual properties,
including concavity and linear homogeneity in factor prices. By Shephard's lemma, the unit
labor and land requirements in arms production are given respectively by  i
w  @ i=@wi > 0
and  i
r  @ i=@ri > 0. Similarly, ai
Kj  @ci
j=@ri > 0 and ai
Lj  @ci
j=@wi > 0 represent the
unit land and labor requirements in producing good j. Therefore, the land/labor ratio in
guns is ki
G   i
r= i




is land-intensive if ki
2 > ki
1 (or labor-intensive if ki
2 < ki
1) at all relevant factor prices. (We
follow much of the literature based on the HOS trade model in ruling out factor intensity
reversals.) Although we will show how the ranking of factor intensities across industries
j = 1;2 matters, for specicity we emphasize throughout much of the discussion the case
where good 2 is produced intensively with the insecure resource (i.e., land).
Taking good 1 as the numeraire, let pi denote the relative price of good 2 in country i.
through. However, to highlight how pure trade in goods aects arming incentives, we abstract from such
possibilities in this analysis.
6With diversication in production, perfect competition requires
c1(wi;ri) = ai
L1wi + ai
K1ri = 1 (2)
c2(wi;ri) = ai
L2wi + ai
K2ri = pi; (3)
for i = 1;2. These equations, together with the assumption of identical technologies across
countries and the properties of unit cost functions, imply that the wage/rental ratio, !i 
wi=ri, can be written as a function of the relative price (i.e., !i = !(pi)). By the Stolper-
Samuelson (1941) theorem, a rise in pi increases the return to that factor which is used
most intensively in the production of good 2, and at the same time decreases the return to
the other factor: !i
p( @!=@pi) 7 0 as ki
2 ? ki
1 (see Lemma A.1(a) in the Appendix).
Let (Ki
X;Li
X) denote the vector of residual quantities of resources left for the production
of consumption goods in country i at the end of stage (ii), once labor and land resources
have already been employed in the production of guns Gi, respectively  i
wGi and  i
rGi,
and the distribution of the contested resource has been realized, iK0. Furthermore, let Xi
j
denote the output of good j. Then, factor-market clearing and diversication in production













X ( Li    i
wGi): (5)
Now, let ki








Ki + iK0    i
rGi
Li    i
wGi ; for i = 1;2: (6)
Then, it is straightforward to verify, from (4) and (5) along with the linear homogeneity of
unit cost functions and the fact that !i = !(pi), that the relative supply of good 2 (oil),
RSi  Xi
2=Xi
1, can be written as RSi = RS(pi;ki
X). In the Appendix (Lemma A.1) we
show that the relative supply of good 2 is increasing in the relative price due to increasing
opportunity costs: @RSi=@pi > 0. In addition, we establish, consistent with the Rybczynski
(1955) theorem, that an increase in the residual land/labor ratio causes an increase in the
relative supply of the good that uses land intensively: @RSi=@ki
X ? 0 as ki
2 ? ki
1. Further,
as can be seen from (6), when both goods are produced, the residual land/labor ratio can
be written as a function of the relative price of good 2, the guns produced by the two
countries, and resource endowments. To avoid cluttering of notation, we write this function
as ki
X = ki
X(pi;Gi;Gj). Lemma A.2 in the Appendix describes the dependence of ki
X on
its arguments. The important point to recognize at this stage is that the relative supply
7of good 2 can also be written as a function of the price and guns: RSi = RS(pi;Gi;Gj).
In the next section, we characterize the exact nature of this relationship, as needed in the
identication of market-clearing prices and in the analysis of conict under autarky.
Turning to the demand side, let Ri and i  (pi) denote respectively net national
income and the marginal utility of income. Country i's indirect utility (aggregate welfare)
function can then be written as7
V i  V i(pi;Gi;Gj) = (pi)Ri(pi;Ki
X;Li
X); for i = 1;2 (j 6= i): (7)
Equation (7) implicitly assumes that policymakers nance the cost of arming with nondis-
tortionary income taxes. This assumption, together with that of perfect competition, im-
plies that country i's net national income (Ri) is the country's maximized value of do-
mestic production of consumption goods and, at the same time, the minimized value of





X for i = 1;2, which explains the arguments of Ri and
V i in (7). Ri should be identied with the familiar gross domestic product (GDP) or rev-
enue function (Dixit and Norman, 1980), excluding arms expenditures. As one can verify,
Ri is increasing and convex in pi, and increasing and concave in the residual factor in-
puts (Ki
X;Li
X). Furthermore, the supply of good 2 satises Xi
2 = Ri
p ( @Ri=@pi) and
@Xi
2=@pi = Ri
pp  0, while factor prices satisfy wi = Ri
L ( @Ri=@Li




Using Roy's identity, country i's demand function for good 2 can be written as Di
2 =
i
DRi=pi, where the associated expenditure share is given by i
D  D(pi) =  pii
p=i
(> 0). Now, since the supply of good 2 is given by Xi
2 = Ri
p, the excess demand for (or
net imports of) good 2 is given by Mi  Di
2   Xi
2. Then, holding xed the secure resource
endowments (Ki and Li) as well as the disputed resource (K0), total dierentiation of (7)
yields
dV i = (pi)

 Midpi + (riK0i
Gi    i)dGi + riK0i
GjdGj
for i = 1;2 (j 6= i): (8)
The rst term inside the square brackets, weighted by the marginal utility of income (pi),
is a terms of trade eect. For net importers of good 2, an increase in pi increases the
domestic cost of good 2, and is thus welfare-reducing. By contrast, a price increase is
welfare-improving for net exporters of good 2.
The second term in the brackets (weighted by (pi)) captures the welfare eect of a
change in country i's guns, Gi. Ceteris paribus, an increase in Gi increases country i's share
of the contested land and thus its national income (the rst term inside the parentheses).
7In this expression, we suppress the obvious dependence of V
i on resource endowments to avoid cluttering.
8At the same time, however, the increase in Gi draws additional resources away from the
production of consumption goods and thus reduces national income (the second term).
The third term in the brackets (again weighted by (pi)) captures the welfare eect of
a change in arms by country i's opponent, Gj. An increase in Gj reduces country i's share
of the contested resource and thus its income, and thereby adversely aects that country.
Note that, for xed product prices, an equi-proportionate expansion of both countries'
guns, where G1 = G2 initially, implies no change in the division of the contested land, while
increasing the resource cost of guns, and thus necessarily leaves both countries worse o.
We now demonstrate how the above ideas inform the derivation of the optimizing se-
curity policies (arming) under alternative trade regimes. A key feature of the optimization
problem for the choice of arming for each country i is that, with diversication in production,
the corresponding rst-order condition (FOC), given by
V i
Gi(pi;Gi;Gj) = (pi)ri 
K0i
Gi    i=ri
= 0 for i = 1;2 (j 6= i); (9)
is the same regardless of the trade regime in place.8 Under autarky, domestic product
market clearing requires pi to adjust so that Mi = 0, which implies that the rst term
inside the brackets in (8) vanishes, thereby yielding (9) as the relevant FOC. Under free
trade in consumption goods, product prices are invariant to security policies for \small"
countries; thus, the rst term also vanishes under this trade regime.
Equation (9) shows that country i's net marginal payo from arming consists of two key
components: (i) the marginal benet of producing guns, which is given by MBi  K0i
Gi
when measured in land units; and (ii) the marginal cost of producing guns, which is given
by MCi   i=ri (again measured in land units).
In the Appendix (Lemma A.3), we establish some important properties of both of these
components and thus of the net marginal payo from arming, particularly their dependence
on arming by both countries and on the relative price. For now, observe from equation
(A.3) in the Appendix that MBi is decreasing in i's guns (Gi) given the guns chosen by
its rival (Gj), as illustrated in Fig. 1.9 Furthermore, from (A.4), MBi rises or falls with
Gj (i.e., MBi in Fig. 1 shifts up or down) depending on which contender initially produces
more guns.10 But, since changes in the relative price pi (given arming by both countries)
have no inuence on MBi, the marginal benet is independent of the trade regime in place.
8Our discussion here and to follow is based on the assumption that, under autarky, the distribution
of factor endowments between the adversaries is such that their production of arms is not constrained
by their secure land holdings. Under free trade, we assume further that technology, the distribution of
factor endowments, the quantity of the contested resource and the world price are such that production of
consumption goods is diversied.
9In addition, from equation (A.3), the condition that limGi!0 f
0(G
i) = 1 implies limGi!0 MB
i = 1.
10Of course, MB
i also depends positively on the amount of land being disputed, K0.
9By contrast, MCi does depend on pi through factor prices. At an optimum, the nature
of this inuence depends on the ranking of the factor intensities in industries 1 and 2.
To see this eect, rst observe that the linear homogeneity of the unit cost function for
guns ( i) and the fact that  i
w > 0 imply that country i's marginal cost of arming can
be written as MCi =  i=ri =  (!i;1) and is increasing in !i, country's wage/rental ratio.




1), an increase in
pi decreases (increases) !i and thus decreases (increases) MCi. Either way, this inuence
implies that the dependence of MCi on Gi is trade-regime dependent. Under free trade when
production is diversied, the world price alone determines !i. Since !i is thus invariant to
changes in Gi, so is the marginal cost of guns, as illustrated by MCi
F (the dotted line) in
Fig. 1. Under autarky, product and thus factor prices are endogenous. In the next section,
we show that the marginal cost under this regime is generally increasing in Gi, as depicted
by MCi
A in Fig. 1.
3 Trade Regimes and Insecurity
Building on the results above, we now explore the implications of autarky and free trade
for arming. The central objective here is to characterize how the trade regime in place
inuences arming incentives. We dierentiate between trade regimes with subscripts \A"
for autarky and \F" for free trade.
3.1 Autarky
The rst-order conditions in (9) reveal that, regardless of the trade regime in place, the
two countries' optimizing choices for guns (Gi for i = 1;2) depend on the product prices
prevailing in the respective country, pi. Thus, to close the model we need an additional
condition, one for each country i, that determines the autarkic price, pi
A (for i = 1;2).
These conditions require domestic markets to clear: Mi










for i = 1;2, j 6= i (10)
where RD(pi) denotes the relative demand for good 2. While the demand for good 2, as
noted above, is given by Di
2 = i
DRi=pi, the demand for good 1 is Di
1 = (1   i
D)Ri; as





1 D(pi). One can show that
RD(pi) is uniquely determined by and decreasing in the relative price of good 2, pi. In
addition, as noted above and shown in Lemma A.1(c), the relative supply of good 2 (RSi)
is increasing in pi.
Using (10), Lemma A.4 presented in the Appendix shows how the equilibrium price is
inuenced by changes in the land/labor ratio (ki
X) induced by exogenous changes in guns
10and resource endowments. Most important for our purposes here, part (a) of the lemma
implies that a country's marginal cost of producing guns under autarky, MCi
A =  (!(pi
A);1),
is increasing in the country's own guns regardless of the ranking of factor intensities in the
consumption goods industries. The logic here is as follows. In the neighborhood of the
optimum implicitly dened by (9), an increase in Gi raises country i's residual land/labor
ratio, ki
X (see Lemma A.2(b)). Now, suppose ki
2 > ki
1. Then, as shown in Lemma A.1(b),
this increase translates into an increase in the relative supply of good 2 (RSi), causing the
autarkic price of good 2 (pi
A) to fall. Alternatively, if ki
2 < ki
1, the increase in ki
X causes
pi
A to rise. In both cases, by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (Lemma A.1(a)), these price
adjustments, in turn, force the wage/rental ratio (!i) to rise and thus induce MCi
A to rise
with Gi.
Obviously, the intersection of MCi
A with MBi at point A in Fig. 1 gives country i's
best-response function under autarky, Bi
A(Gj). The shape of this function depends on how
both the marginal cost and marginal benet functions are inuenced by the rival's arming,
Gj. As implied by Lemma A.4(b), MCi
A is negatively related to Gj; and, from Lemma
A.3(b), MBi is increasing (decreasing) in Gj when Gi > Gj (Gi < Gj). Thus, as illustrated
with solid-line curves in Fig. 2, Bi
A(Gj) depends positively on Gj (reecting strategic
complementarity) up to and beyond its point of intersection with the 45 line; however,
at some point beyond that intersection, the function can become negatively related to Gj
(reecting strategic substitutability).
One can show, under fairly general circumstances, that an interior Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies (security policies) exists in the autarkic trade regime. Furthermore, the
equilibrium is unique if the technology for arms is not very land-intensive or if the inputs to
arms are not very close complements.11 The conictual (Nash) equilibrium under autarky
is depicted by the intersection of the best-response functions.12 One such equilibrium|a
symmetric one|is point A in Fig. 2, where B1
A and B2
A intersect along the 45 line. Point
A0 (where B10
A and B20
A intersect) shows an asymmetric equilibrium.
Whether the equilibrium under autarky is symmetric or asymmetric depends on the
technologies for producing consumption goods, the technology of conict (1), the degree of
resource insecurity (institutions), and the size of the secure endowments of land and labor, as
11The proof, which is presented in the Supplementary Appendix available from the authors upon request,
is based on the assumption that not all secure land supplies are absorbed into the production of guns, but can
be amended to allow this possibility. One sucient condition that precludes this complication from arising
is that the degree of land insecurity (i.e., the fraction of contested land) is not too high. Another possible
condition is that guns are produced with labor only. Note that, in any case, provided that both factors are
essential to the production of consumption goods, labor will never be fully absorbed in the production of
guns in the autarkic regime.
12Note that, because each country always has an incentive to produce a small (but positive) quantity of
arms when its rival produces none, (0;0) is not a Nash equilibrium.
11each inuences autarkic prices and thus the marginal cost of arming.13 To proceed, consider
rst the benchmark case, where countries 1 and 2 have identical secure endowments. We
dierentiate the resulting symmetric equilibrium values from others, by placing a tilde ()
over the associated variables. Since the countries are identical, they face identical arming
incentives; therefore, Gi
A = e G
A for i = 1;2, with each country thus receiving one half of the
contested resource, K0. Furthermore, by Lemma A.5 presented in the Appendix, pi
A = e p
A,
and thus !i
A = e !
A and ki
X = e k
X for each i.
In what follows, we distinguish between two distinct sets of secure endowments of land
and labor that dier in their predictions for the relative amounts of arms the two countries
produce under autarky: S0 denotes the set of secure endowment distributions implying a
symmetric solution such that G1
A = G2
A = e G
A, and Si denotes the set of secure endowment
distributions implying an asymmetric outcome such that Gi
A > G
j
A (j 6= i). Clearly, S0
includes the benchmark case where the two countries have identical secure endowments.
The next lemma establishes that S0 includes other distributions as well.
Lemma 1 (Arming and Autarkic Prices) Under autarky, there exists a non-empty set of
asymmetric factor distributions under which contending states face identical market-clearing
prices, produce identical quantities of arms, and are equally powerful. All other asymmetric
distributions generate dierent prices and unequal arming and power. Specically, for each
country i = 1;2 (j 6= i),
(a) Gi
A = e G
A and pi
A = e p
A for secure factor distributions in S0, where ki















To see what other distributions yield the symmetric outcome, suppose that, starting
from the benchmark case, both land and labor resources are transferred from country 2 to




















each i. By construction, such a redistribution of resources, for constant guns and prices,
leaves the value of country i's residual land/labor ratios unchanged at ki
X = e k
X, i = 1;2.
Thus, the countries' relative supply and relative demand functions do not shift; and, there
is no pressure for autarkic prices to change. But, given prices do, in fact, remain xed at
e p
A, arming incentives remain unchanged in both countries. Thus, S0 consists of all secure
resource distributions implying the same residual land/labor ratio as that for two identical
countries, k1
X = k2
X = e k
X. They all imply the same symmetric outcome.14
13Recall that MB
i is independent of p
i.
14Notice that the logic of this experiment remains intact for numerous conict technologies, including
those that permit non-additivity but maintain symmetry and some that permit asymmetry such as that













2), where ' 2 (0;1). In the presence of a more general sort of asymmetry, guns need not be
equalized even when secure endowments are identical, but their values will not change from the benchmark
case with transfers of secure land and labor that imply k
i
X = e k

X.
12To see how S0 diers from Si, the set of secure resource endowments implying an
asymmetric outcome such that Gi
A > G
j
A , consider an initial secure resource distribution in
S0. From the discussion above, the conictual equilibrium is initially on the 45 line of Fig.
2, at point A, where B1
A and B2
A intersect. Now arbitrarily transfer labor only from country
2 to country 1, and to x ideas suppose that ki
2 > ki
1. Then, according to Lemma A.4(d),
this transfer of labor raises country 1's autarkic price, which in turn decreases its marginal
cost of arming (Lemma A.3(c)); at the same, the loss of labor for country 2 reduces its
autarkic price, and thus increases its marginal cost of arming. As a consequence, country 1
(2) will behave more (less) aggressively, as shown in Fig. 2 by the clockwise rotation of B1
A
to B10
A and that of B2
A to B20
A. The uniqueness of equilibrium ensures that the intersection
of the new best response functions, B10
A and B20
A, lies below the 45 line, such as point A0 in
the gure, where clearly country 1 arms more heavily than its adversary. As conrmed in
the Appendix, this eect on the countries' arming incentives holds regardless of the ranking
of factor intensities of the two consumption goods. But, this ranking does matter for the
ranking of their autarkic prices. In particular, by Lemma A.5, the divergence in the two




1. This dierence in
pi
A across countries i = 1;2 together with Lemma A.4 allows us to distinguish further S0
from S1. Specically, whereas k1
X = k2
X = e k
X for distributions of secure endowments in
S0, we have k1
X < k2
X for distributions in S1 regardless of the ranking of factor intensities
across industries.15
3.2 Free trade
Turning to trade, we suppose the contending countries are \small" in world markets and
that there are no trade costs. Letting  denote the international price of the non-numeraire
good, free trade in consumption goods requires pi = , for i = 1;2. Since  is given by world
markets and is thus independent of national security policies, a country's payo function
can be identied with its indirect utility function, V i. Depending on fundamentals, the
degree of land insecurity, and the international price level, it is possible, as in the case of
autarky, for arms production to be constrained by the countries' secure land holdings.16
However, it is also possible now for one or both contestants to specialize completely in the
production of one consumption good. But, to highlight the factor-price eects of opening
borders up to free trade and the striking implications this can have for arming incentives,
we abstract from these two possible complications.
One can show that when (i) free trade in consumption goods leads to international factor
15For distributions in S
1 adjacent to S
0, we have k
1




X , as implied by the proof to Lemma A.6
in the Appendix.
16As in the case of autarky, countries will not use their entire labor endowments in the production of guns,
provided that both factors are essential in the production of consumption goods.
13price equalization, and (ii) the production of arms does not exhaust either country's secure
land endowment, an interior Nash equilibrium in security policies will exist, and will be
unique and symmetric. Here we focus on the logic underlying the symmetric feature of the
free-trade equilibrium.17
Suppose for now that  = e p
A and that the two countries have identical secure re-
source endowments. Provided conditions (i) and (ii) stated above are satised, the in-
tersection of MBi and MCi
F (as illustrated in Fig. 1 at point A) determines country
i's best-response under free trade, Bi
F(Gj; e p
A). Since product and thus factor prices are
independent of either country's security policy in this trade regime, the shapes of best-
response functions are determined solely by the properties of the CSF (1), i|that is,
@Bi




GiGi ? 0 when Gi ? Gj. Thus, as illustrated in
Fig. 2, the best-response functions under free trade are upward-sloping (reecting strategic
complementarity) up to their point of intersection with the 45 line, and downward slop-
ing (reecting strategic substitutability) thereafter. When secure resources are identically
distributed across the two countries, they face identical marginal benet and marginal cost
functions for guns, thereby yielding the symmetric equilibrium, point A in Figure 2 where
Gi
F = e G
A for i = 1;2.18 What about when secure endowments are unevenly distributed
across the two countries? Provided that the distribution is such that free trade in consump-
tion goods implies international factor price equalization19 and such that the production of
guns does not exhaust either country's secure land resources,20 the contending states will
continue to face identical marginal benet and marginal cost functions for guns, thus again
yielding the symmetric Nash equilibrium: Gi
F = e G
A when  = e p
A. We label this set of
17The proofs of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium are similar to those presented for the case of
autarky (see the Supplementary Appendix). To be sure, existence and uniqueness of equilibrium arise under
less restrictive conditions than (i) and (ii). However, relaxing these two conditions only complicates the
analysis without altering the key insights of our comparison of conict under autarky and free trade.





F for i = 1;2, equals that which emerges under autarky assuming identical adversaries, e G

A,
is due to our (benchmark) assumption that  = e p

A. Below we show how changes in  inuence the level of
arming by both countries.
19The conditions for international factor price equalization include, as in the standard HOS trade model,
constant returns to scale in production, the absence of factor intensity reversals, identical technologies across
countries, diversication in production, absence of market failures or distortions, no trade barriers, and the
existence of at least as many productive factors in the tradable goods sectors as there are traded goods
(Samuelson, 1949). For distributions of secure resources where these conditions are not satised, at least
one country will specialize in the production of one consumption good. Such specialization precludes the
possibility of international factor price equalization and renders a country's marginal cost of producing guns
independent of the world price, but increasing in its arms.
20Even where one country's secure land constraint binds in the production of guns, free trade in con-
sumption goods can nonetheless lead to factor price equalization. Once the disputed land is divided, both
countries diversify in their production of the two goods. However, due to the binding resource constraint,
the marginal benet of producing more arms is not equalized across countries. Accordingly, free trade does
not lead to arms equalization in this case, and more generally factor price equalization alone need not imply
arms equalization.
14distributions the \arms equalization set" (AES). Under free trade given  = e p
A, redistri-
butions of secure endowments across the two contending countries within the AES have no
eect on their arming.21 We note that, while the sets S0, S1, and S2 are dened under
autarky and thus are independent of the world price, the AES subsets of S0, S1, and S2
for which free trade leads to arms equalization are not.22
We now turn to explore the implications of changes in international prices for arming.
To proceed, note that, given the allocation of secure resources, there exists a range of prices
(i;i) for each country i that ensures diversication in the production of consumption
goods for that country. Then, for world prices  2 (;), where  = maxf1;2g and
 = minf1;2g, production is diversied in both countries. By contrast, for world prices
 = 2 (;), where   minf1;2g   and   maxf1;2g  , both countries specialize
in production.23 Using these denitions, we have the following:
Lemma 2 (Arming and International Prices) Assume that secure land endowments are
not exhausted in the production of guns. Then,
(a) equilibrium guns are increasing in the world price of the land-intensive good for world
prices  2 (;) (i.e., dGi
F =d ? 0 8 2 (;) if ki
2 ? ki
1, for i = 1;2); and,
(b) equilibrium guns are invariant to price changes for all world prices  = 2 (;) (i.e.,
dGi
F =d = 0, 8 = 2 (;)).
We prove this lemma informally. To x ideas, suppose good 2 is land-intensive (ki
2 > ki
1)
and that the conditions specied in part (a) are satised. Thus, factor prices and arms are
equalized across countries. Now, let the world price of good 2 () rise. While this price
change has no eect on either country's marginal benet of arming (MBi), by the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem (Lemma A.1(a)) the wage/rental ratio in each contending country (!i)
will fall; and, as previously discussed, this factor price adjustment will cause each country i's
marginal cost of arming (MCi
F) to fall (Lemma A.3(c)), thereby inducing both to arm more
heavily. (Analogous reasoning establishes that, when good 1 is land-intensive (ki
1 > ki
2), an
increase in  2 (;) will induce less arming.) Turning to part (b), note that, from equations
(2){(5), price changes outside the relevant range for country i,  = 2 (i;i), force all factor
prices to rise proportionately in that country and thus have no eect on the marginal cost
of arming. Part (b), then, follows from the condition imposed implying both countries
specialize in production. But, for our purposes, the important point is that changes in the
21These ndings would remain unchanged assuming alternative specications for the CSF as described
earlier in footnote 14.
22For example, as  moves away from e p

A, these subsets shrink.
23Of course, for identical adversaries,  =  and  = . But, for adversaries having dierent secure factor
endowments, there also exist price ranges for which one country's gun choices depend on prices while the
other country's do not|namely, (;) and (;). However, these complications are not relevant for our
arguments.
15world price have important implications for security policies when production is diversied.
Furthermore, the qualitative nature of that linkage hinges on the technology|namely, the
ranking of factor intensities, ki
j (j = 1;2).
However, for simplicity and clarity, henceforth we maintain the assumption that good
2 is land-intensive|i.e., ki
2 > ki
1. Unless otherwise noted, the results that follow remain
intact regardless of the ranking of factor intensities.
4 Trade Patterns and Trade Volumes
Naturally, the direction of a country's trade ows depends on the world price. To ex-
plore this issue, dene i
A as the level of the world price that eliminates country i's trade:
Mi
F () 7 0 if  ? i
A.24 In what follows, we contribute two ideas to the literature. First,
we illustrate that international contestation of resources alters a country's trade-eliminating
price relative to the case of no conict and can thus aect its observed comparative advan-
tage. Second, we show that such conict can drive a wedge between a country's autarkic
price and trade-eliminating price under free trade such that a simple comparison of inter-
national and autarkic prices need not provide an accurate prediction of trade patterns in
contending countries.
To explore the eects of conict on a contending country's comparative advantage,
consider the case of identical adversaries. Let pA(G) denote the representative country's
autarkic price as it depends on the common quantity of guns, G. When evaluated at
the conictual equilibrium level of arming under autarky, Gi
A = e G
A, pA(G) = e p
A holds.
Furthermore, when  = e p
A, the equilibrium under free trade corresponds precisely with
the equilibrium under autarky. That is to say, the world price that eliminates a contending
country's trade ows equals the equilibrium price that obtains under autarky (i.e., i
A = e p
A).
Therefore, under conict and trade, both adversaries will export the land-intensive good
j = 2 if  > e p
A and will import it if  < e p
A. In the hypothetical case of no arming, from
equation (1), each adversary would receive 1
2 of the contested resource K0, and the autarkic
price would coincide with the price pn
A = pA(0).25 Thus, in the absence of conict, the
representative country would export the land-intensive good if  > pn
A and would import it
if  < pn
A.
24As in the neoclassical version of this setting with no insecurity, the negative inuence of the world price
 on each country's excess demand M
i
F () follows from what is eectively a condition for stability of general
equilibrium under free trade. However, when there is insecurity, one has to account for the indirect inuence
of a change in  on k
i
X through its eect on arming by both countries. As such, the presence of insecurity
makes the condition for stability slightly more complicated. Interestingly, this condition is identical to
a sucient condition for uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium under autarky (see equation (B.4) and the
surrounding discussion in the Supplementary Appendix). Intuitively, this makes sense, since prices under
autarky change to clear domestic markets and policymakers take that eect into account when choosing
their guns.
25The superscript \n" stands for \no conict" or \Nirvana".
16The eect of conict on the contending countries' pattern of trade works through its
eect on the countries' residual factor endowments. This eect depends specically on the
relative ranking of ki and ki
G(!), as it determines whether an exogenous equi-proportionate
increase in guns produced by both countries (where initially Gi = Gj) increases or decreases
ki
X (by Lemma A.2(d)), and thus determines the qualitative nature of the dependence of
pA(G) on the common quantity of guns G. In particular, from Lemma A.4(c) with the
maintained assumption that good 2 is land-intensive, the additional assumption that guns
production is suciently labor-intensive|i.e., ki > ki
G(!)|implies that pA(G) depends
negatively on G. In this case, pn
A = pA(0) > pA(e G
A) = e p
A. Now suppose  2 (e p
A;pn
A).
Obviously, since  < pn
A, under no conict both contestants would import good 2. But, since
 > e p
A at the same time, under conict each country exports good 2. Alternatively, if ki <
ki
G(!), then pA(G) would be increasing in G and as a result pn
A < e p
A. Thus, if  2 (pn
A; e p
A),
then each country would export the land-intensive good j = 2 in the hypothetical case of no
conict, and import the good under conict. The following proposition summarizes these
results.
Proposition 1 (Trade Patterns with Identical Adversaries) Conict over land reverses
the contending countries' comparative advantage for  2 (e p
A;pn




A) if ki < ki
G(!); as compared with what would be observed in the hypothetical
case of no conict.
Although the nature of the distortion of conict on trade patterns also depends on the
relative ranking of factor intensities in industries j = 1;2, the result that such a distortion
can emerge does not.26
Our analysis suggests further that viewing international conict over productive re-
sources as a type of trade cost that necessarily reduces the size of a contending country's
trade ows might be inappropriate. If, for example,  = pn
A, then in the absence of conict
the contestants would not engage in trade. But, as we have just seen, in the presence of
conict and under free trade, the contending countries will be net exporters (importers) of
the land-intensive good if ki > ki
G(!) (ki < ki
G(!)); consequently, depending on the world
price, international conict may very well expand, rather than shrink, trade volumes.27
Moving on to the second main point of this section, neoclassical trade theory tells
us that a country's trade pattern can be identied by comparing the world price to its
26This result is reminiscent of Brander and Taylor's (1997b) nding that, over time, the depletion of a
common-pool resource in a country with ill-dened property rights can reverse its comparative advantage. In
our setting, residual factor endowments (and thus comparative advantage) can change because the dissipation
of resources in conict is trade-regime dependent.
27The relationship between the volume of trade and conict has been addressed empirically in the political
science literature (e.g., Barbieri, 2002), which appears to nd support for the idea that conict might
stimulate trade.
17autarkic price. However, in the world of insecure property and international conict, a
country's trade-eliminating price under free trade need not coincide with its autarkic price,
particularly when there are dierences in secure factor ownership across the two contending
countries. As such, an unqualied application of the standard logic normally used in trade
theory can lead to erroneous inferences about trade patterns.
Now, it should be clear from our earlier discussion in Section 3.2 that, when the (uneven)
distribution of secure resources lies in the AES subset of S0, the trade-eliminating price
coincides with the autarkic price: i
A = e p
A. In this case, the standard logic does apply: if
 ? e p
A, then Mi
F () 7 0. Matters dier, however, when the distribution falls in the AES
subset of Si, i = 1 or 2. For in this case, the introduction of free trade, through its impact
on factor prices, relative factor demands, and thus arming incentives, alters the countries'
residual factor endowments and therefore their excess demand functions.
To gain some intuition here, suppose that  = p2
A and consider a distribution of secure
resources in the AES subset of S1, where country 1 is relatively more aggressive under
autarky, as illustrated by point A0 in Fig. 2. Then, from (9), the introduction of free trade
gives country 2 no incentive to adjust its guns choice as long as G1 = G1
A . However, since
 = p2
A < p1
A (by Lemma A.5), a shift to free trade induces country 1 to be less aggressive,
and (given the negative inuence of G1 on B2
F(G1) for G2 < G1) this in turn induces
country 2 be more aggressive until the free trade equilibrium, where arms are equalized,
is reached. With these adjustments in guns, country 2's residual land/labor ratio, k2
X,
necessary increases (Lemma A.7(a)). Then, from Lemma A.1(b), country 2's excess supply
of good 2, when evaluated at the autarkic price, p2
A , is strictly positive. As such, the world
price that eliminates country 2's trade, 2
A, must be below the country's autarkic price,
p2
A .28 Similar reasoning establishes that 1
A 6= p1
A almost always. In particular, a move to
free trade with  = p1
A > p2
A induces both countries to increase their arming and these
adjustments have osetting eects on country 1's residual land/labor ratio (k1
X). Thus, it
would be only by coincidence that 1
A = p1
A . It is possible that 1
A < p1




The following proposition summarizes these results and takes them a step further:









29As revealed by equation (A.17), k
1
X tends to fall on net as both countries increase their arming, provided






1) is not too large relative to











L (see the proof to Lemma A.7).
18Proposition 2 (Trade Patterns with Nonidentical Adversaries) For uneven secure factor
endowments in the AES subset of S0; we have i
A = e p
A, as in the neoclassical trade theory.




A , we have i
A 6= pi




A always, such that comparing
the international price to a contending country's autarkic price need not give an accurate
prediction of that country's trade pattern.
The key point to take from Proposition 2 is that there can be some divergence between
a country's autarkic price and its trade-eliminating price under free trade, so as to alter
the informational content of the dierence between the world price and the autarkic price.
Returning to our example, for  2 (2
A;p2
A ), the less aggressive country (i = 2) in the
autarkic equilibrium exports good 2 under free trade, whereas neoclassical theory predicts
that it imports the good. Clearly, if arming were independent of the trade regime considered,
the trade eliminating price and the autarkic price would be the same. But, the trade regime
does inuence arming that, given an uneven distribution of secure endowments across the
two countries, can inuence each country's excess demand function and thus drive a wedge
between these two prices. Thus, the direction of trade ows is not determined by how the
international price diers from the country's autarkic price, pi
A, but rather how it diers
from its trade-eliminating price, i
A.
5 Welfare Comparison of Trade Regimes
In this section, we illustrate that the costs of arming can overwhelm a country's traditional
gains from trade. The analysis not only claries how international conict generates a
trade-regime dependent distortion (Bhagwati, 1971), but also sheds light on the conditions
under which free trade intensies this distortion.















, for i = 1;2 and j 6= i. (11)
The rst term inside the brackets, weighted by the marginal utility of income (()), cap-
tures the direct welfare eect of a price change, and its sign is determined by the country's
trade pattern. It is positive for net exporters of the non-numeraire good (Mi
F < 0), and
negative for net importers (Mi
F > 0). The second term (again weighted by ()) captures
the strategic welfare eect of a price change. By the properties of the CSF (1) and Lemma
2(a) under the maintained assumption that ki
2 > ki
1, this indirect eect is negative when
arms are equalized internationally. But, by Lemma 2(b), the eect vanishes when the world
price rises above  or falls below . The next lemma takes these ideas one step further.
19Lemma 3 (International Prices and Welfare) A contending country i's welfare is
(a) decreasing in the world price of the good that employs intensively the contested re-
source, in the neighborhood of  = i
A (i.e., dV i
F (i
A)=d < 0);
(b) increasing in the world price of the good that employs intensively the contested re-
source for  > ; and,
(c) minimized at a world price,  = i
min > (i
A).
Part (a) points out that an improvement in a contending country's terms of trade is neces-
sarily \immiserizing" if the country exports the land-intensive product and provided that
 does not dier considerably from its trade eliminating price, i
A. Specically, in the
neighborhood of i
A, the direct, positive eect of a terms of trade improvement on country
i's income (the rst term in (11)) is swamped by the loss in income due to its opponent's
increased aggressiveness (the second term in (11)). However, part (b) indicates that, when
the world price becomes suciently large to induce specialization in production by both
countries ( >  such that @Gi
F=@ = 0), this latter eect vanishes, leaving only the direct
(positive) welfare eect of the terms of trade improvement. Finally, part (c) indicates that
a country's welfare is minimized at some price, i
min > i
A, where the benecial, direct
eect of a terms of trade improvement equals the adverse strategic eect that results from
increased arms production by the rival country.30
Thus, there exists a range of world prices,  2 (i
A;i
min), for which international conict
over resources can expose contending countries with an apparent comparative advantage in
the contested-resource-intensive products to the \resource curse" problem. Others have
attributed the problem to domestic rent-seeking (e.g., Torvik, 2002; Mehlum et al. 2006),
redistributive politics (e.g., Robinson et al., 2005), and domestic conict (Garnkel et al.,
2008). But, our nding suggests that the absence and/or ineectiveness of international
institutions aimed at managing international conict has a bearing on this problem as well.
Although country size is inconsequential in the determination of the quantity of guns
that adversaries produce under free trade for secure factor endowments in the AES, country
size does matter for the determination of the range of international prices for which the
resource curse problem arises. Consider, for example, an uneven distribution of secure
resources in the AES subset of S0, where country 1 is larger than country 2 and where
initially  = i
A = e p
A. From (11), the strategic welfare eect of an increase in the world
price, , above e p
A (the second term in (11)) will not dier across adversaries. However,
the marginal benet from such a price increase (the rst term in (11)) will dier. Since, by
construction, country 1 is larger than country 2, country 1 will be relatively more involved
in trade than its rival (i.e.,  M1
F >  M2
F > 0) for  > e p
A, which implies 1
min < 2
min.





20Accordingly, for uneven factor distributions in S0, the relatively smaller adversary (i = 2 in
our example) will experience the resource curse problem over a larger range of international
prices.
To proceed with our comparison of welfare across the two trade regimes, we consider
two possibilities: (i) when adversaries are identical, which unveils the gist of the argument
and the circumstances under which autarky dominates trade; and, (ii) when adversaries
have dierent endowment proles, which sheds some light on the conditions under which
national preferences over trade regimes can diverge.
Proposition 3 (Relative Appeal of Free Trade with Identical Adversaries) If free trade in
consumption goods induces adversaries with identical endowment proles to
(a) export the land-intensive good, then the adversaries will arm more heavily under free
trade than under autarky, and free trade will be Pareto dominated by autarky for a
certain range of international prices close enough to the autarkic price;
(b) import the land-intensive good, there will be less arming under free trade than under
autarky, and free trade will Pareto dominate autarky.
To understand the logic here, let G() denote the equilibrium quantity of guns under
free trade, as implicitly dened by (9), when the two adversaries are identical. Of course,
this function when evaluated at  = ~ p
A 2 (;) also gives us the equilibrium level of arming
under autarky. By Lemma 2(a) with ki
2 > ki
1, G() is increasing in  for  2 (;). Thus,
for  > e p
A, where the adversaries export the land-intensive good, a discrete move from
autarky to free trade intensies the conict between them, inducing more arming. By
contrast, for  < e p
A, where the adversaries import the land-intensive good, a move to free
trade from autarky weakens the conict, inducing less arming.31
Turning to payos, rst note that, for given guns, a country's welfare increases with
the deviation of the world price from its autarky level e p
A (Lemma A.3(d)). This eect
reects the familiar gains from trade. Observe further that, regardless of the trade regime
considered, equi-proportionate arms increases do not alter the division of the contested land
but raise the resource costs of insecurity. As such, the representative country's welfare is
decreasing in guns, G. Since G() is increasing in  for  2 (;), these security costs are
strictly increasing in  over that range. Now, when  = e p
A, e G
A = e G
F; thus, the security
costs are strictly positive, but the same across trade regimes. Furthermore, since e p
A = 
A,
31Note the dierence between this result and that of Hirshleifer (1991), who explored the implications of
conict over output, identifying market integration with the degree of complementarity between the inputs
in useful production. Specically, he observed that the diversion of resources into arms falls with the degree
of market integration, although the size of this eect is small. Our approach suggests that, when conict
is over resources and market integration takes the form of a move from more protected (autarky) to less
protected (free trade) trade regimes, the severity of conict (measured by the level of arming) can rise or fall
depending on, among other things, technology, the degree of resource insecurity and international prices.
21the gains from trade are equal to zero at this world price. As such, welfare is the same
across the two trade regimes: V 
F(e p
A) = e V 
A.
For world prices  < e p
A, where countries import the land-intensive product, the gains
from trade reinforces the eect of trade on equilibrium security costs, such that free trade
is Pareto superior to autarky: V 
F() > e V 
A. By the continuity of V 
F() in  and Lemma
3, there exists a world price 0 that satises V i
F () = e V 
A. Given ki
2 > ki
1, we have 0 >
min > e p
A. Then, for international prices  > e p
A, each contestant exports the contested-
resource-intensive product; furthermore, for international prices within the range (e p
A;0),
autarky will Pareto dominate free trade.
What about adversaries with dierent endowment proles? Arbitrary factor distribu-
tions in Si can complicate the welfare ranking of trade regimes for at least two reasons.
First, because adversaries begin to specialize in production at dierent international prices,
it becomes necessary to investigate arming incentives outside the AES for one country ini-
tially and eventually for both. Second, the endogeneity of trade patterns together with the
fact that V i
F 6= V i
A at  = pi
A for arbitrary distributions in Si make it dicult to identify
workable benchmarks for comparison purposes. Still, as the next proposition illustrates,
there exist two noteworthy asymmetries that yield tractable comparisons.
Proposition 4 (Relative Appeal of Free Trade with Nonidentical Adversaries)
(a) For any uneven factor distribution in the AES subset of S0, there exists a range of
international prices that render autarky Pareto superior to free trade.
(b) If  = e p
A, there exist subsets Di  Si of factor distributions adjacent to the AES
subset of S0 such that one country prefers autarky over free trade while its adversary
does not.
Part (a) extends Proposition 3 to uneven distributions in the AES subset of S0. Part
(b) claries how countries' preferences over trade regimes might dier when more general
factor endowment asymmetries are considered. As shown in the proof (presented in the
Appendix), the divergence in preferences arises from the presence of a strategic eect when
redistributing resources under autarky (Lemma A.6), and the absence of such a strategic
eect under free trade. It is possible to show further, for world prices other than e p
A, that
at least one country prefers autarky over free trade, and this preference could hold even for
a country that imports the good produced intensively with the contested resource.32
6 Concluding Remarks
In the decades leading up to World War I, the proportion of world trade to world GDP had
reached unprecedented magnitudes (O'Rourke and Williamson, 2000). Yet, international
32We provide a proof in the Supplementary Appendix.
22conict ensued with much ferocity and despite expectations to the contrary.33 Similarly, the
expansion of trade in the post World War II era has been spectacular. Still, while interstate
conict might have subsided over this latter period, insecurity and contention continue to
are up in many parts of the world. Whereas not all disputes can be considered to have
material causes, there is no doubt that contestation of water resources, land, oil, diamonds
and other resources by dierent countries has at least some role to play in many international
disputes and drives the military expenditures and security policies of the countries that are
involved in such disputes.
The extent to which disputed resources or the goods they produce are tradable can have
implications for the security policies that countries pursue and the costs those countries
realize as a result. At the same time, the presence of such conict can have implications
for patterns of trade and welfare. We have explored these implications within the context
of the neoclassical trade model augmented by a disputed resource that is costly to contest,
considering two polar regimes: autarky and free trade. The key dierence between these
regimes for small countries is that prices are endogenously determined under autarky but
not under free trade. As a consequence, arming incentives are trade-regime dependent.
Depending on the level of world prices, free trade in consumption goods might intensify
arming incentives to generate additional security costs that swamp the traditional gains from
trade and thus render autarky more desirable for one or both rival states. Furthermore, in
the presence of international conict, a country's apparent comparative advantage can dier
from its natural comparative advantage (absent insecurity) and comparisons of autarkic
prices to world prices could be inappropriate predictors of trade patterns. This nding
suggests that empirical work aiming to relate trade volumes to fundamentals would be
incomplete if it did not include insecurity and contestation of resources.
One might consider the analysis, with its focus on small countries, limited in that it
ignores the possible terms of trade eects in security policy that would be especially relevant
for those countries having monopoly or monopsony power in world trade. Extending the
analysis to the case of large countries would be more complicated, since in such a setting free
trade in consumption goods need not equalize arming incentives even when factor prices are
equalized and guns production is unconstrained. Still, such an extension of the basic model
would provide a rich and promising environment within which to explore, for example, the
simultaneous choices of trade and security policies, the former to balance the terms of trade
eects with the volume of trade eects, and the latter for security considerations.
However, our analysis even with its focus on small countries can say something about
33The prediction before World War I, for example, that war was impossible or unthinkable|because
Britain and Germany had become so economically interdependent that conict was viewed as "commercial
suicide" (Angell, 1933)|was atly contradicted by experience.
23the endogenous determination of trade policies. In particular, whereas our focus has been
based on the implicit assumption that the two countries both commit to either autarky
or free trade, the analysis could easily be extended to consider the non-cooperative choice
of trade regimes by the two countries. When each country chooses its security and trade
regimes simultaneously, it is possible that both countries choose free trade even when the
outcome is Pareto dominated by that which arises when both choose autarky.
The basic model could be fruitfully extended in a number of other ways. For example,
the analysis could assign an active role to the rest of the world (ROW). Furthermore, the
analysis could be generalized to situations where trade does not necessarily result in the
equalization of factor prices, and thus give a meaningful role to the possibility of trade in
arms. Last but not least, policy objectives could be specied to consider the role of politics.
Ultimately, solving the problem of insecurity entails the design and development of
commitment devices that can reduce, and possibly eliminate, the need to arm. Such com-
mitment devices, however, are not easy to come by and, judging from particular historical
instances, they take a long time to develop. Europe is a good example of this. After the
experience of the two world wars, the original six members of the European Community
slowly began to develop mechanisms of economic integration that were, in large part, in-
stitutions of conict management. This twin process of economic integration and conict
resolution through bureaucratic and political struggle, instead of conict in the battleeld,
is ongoing and far from complete, even after a century of tribulations. Trade openness and,
more generally, economic interdependence might help to ameliorate conict, but it would
be naive to think that promoting such interdependence could achieve this by itself.
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27A Appendix
We rst present several useful properties of the CSF in (1). For convenience, dene
fi  f(Gi), where from our previous assumptions f0
i > 0 and f00
i  0. Now, dierenti-















i (f1 + f2)   2(f0






(f1 + f2)3 ? 0 if Gi ? Gj (A.4)
Lemma A.1 If production in a country is diversied (i.e., Xi
j > 0, for both countries
i = 1;2 and both goods j = 1;2), then
(a)
@!i=@pi














Proof: Following Jones (1965), we denote the shares of factor h = K;L in the cost of










r= i and i
LG  wi i
w= i indicate the corresponding cost shares in guns. Now denote the
amount of land and labor employed in industry j = 1;2 respectively by Ki
j and Li
j. Then,
these quantities as a fraction of resources remaining once land and labor for producing guns







let a percentage change be indicated by a hat (^) over the associated variable (e.g., b x = dx
x ).



























































h=K;L hj = 1 for j = 1;2 by denition, the determinant of the coecient
matrix above, denoted by
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From (A.6), then, we have pi!i
p=!i = piwi
p=wi  piri
p=ri =  1=jij 7 0 when ki
2 ? ki
1, which
completes the proof to part (a).






Then, following the strategy above in part (a), we dierentiate (4) and (5) totally and solve







































































@ri being the (absolute value of the) elasticity of substitution between land and
labor in industry j;

i
 denotes the determinant of the coecient matrix obtained from
dierentiating (4) and (5); recalling
P
j=1;2 i























 ? 0 if ki
2 ? ki
1:
Now, observe that b ki
X = b Ki
















Inspection of (A.7) conrms parts (b) and (c). k
In Lemma A.1 the residual land/labor ratio, ki
X, is treated as exogenous. However, from
(6) it is clear that ki
X depends on price, guns, and factor supplies. The next lemma claries
this dependence.
29Lemma A.2 Let ki 
Ki+iK0













@Gi > 0; 8Gi that satisfy Ki
0i











@Gj ? 0 if ki ? ki
















X=Ri, and let i
G =  i i
wr= i
w i
r be the (absolute value of the)
elasticity of substitution between land and labor in the guns sector. Total dierentiation of

















































Parts (a){(c) & (e): The proofs follow from (A.8).
Part (d): Suppose Gi = Gj so that i
Gi =  i















Using the denitions of i
LG, si
L, and Ri, along with those for Ki
X and Li
X in (4) and (5),


































Inspection of this expression conrms part (d). k




GiGj ? 0 if Gi ? Gj, j 6= i;
(c) V i
Gipi ? 0 if ki
2 ? ki
1 when evaluated at the value of Gi that solves V i
Gi = 0;
(d) V i is strictly quasi-convex in pi, and is minimized at the value of pi that solves Mi = 0:
30Proof:
Part (a): Dierentiate (9) with respect to Gi and use (A.3) to obtain
V i
GiGi = iriK0i
GiGi < 0. (A.10)
Part (b): Dierentiation of (8) with respect to Gj and use of (A.4) gives
V i
GiGj = iriK0i
GiGj ? 0 if Gi ? Gj. (A.11)
Part (c): Recall that  i=ri =  (!i;1), implying that @( i=ri)=@pi =  i
w!i
p. Then, dier-
entiating (8) with respect to price and evaluating the resulting expression at the optimum
gives (by Lemma A.1(a))
V i






















? 0 if ki
2 ? ki
1. (A.12)
Part (d): This is a standard property of indirect (trade) utility functions, highlighting the
important idea that, for given guns, a country's welfare is higher, the greater is the deviation
of product prices from their autarkic levels (Dixit and Norman, 1980). k
Lemma A.4 Under autarky, country i's market clearing price of the non-numeraire good,
pi
A, and its residual land/labor ratio, ki





7 0 if ki
2 ? ki
1:




@Gi 7 0 if ki
2 ? ki
1, 8Gi that satisfy V i
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7 0 for Gi = Gj (j 6= i) if ki









@K0 7 0, and
@pi
A




D > 0 be the elasticity of substitution in consumption. Focusing on percentage
changes, note that d RD
i
=  i
Db pi and that the expression for c RS
i
is given in (A.7). Totally































1). Combining the expression for ^ ki











































Gi > 0: The proofs to parts (a){(d) now follow from
(A.13) and Lemma A.2. k






A ) ? 0 () G1
A ? G2
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where, for simplicity, we have omitted stars. Now if ki
2 > ki
1, then by Lemma A.1(a),
 (!(pi);1) is decreasing in pi; therefore, if p1 ? p2, MC1=MC2 7 1, which by the above





p > 0 (Lemma A.1(a)), which implies MC1=MC2 ? 1 if p1 ? p2. But
then MB1=MB2 ? 1 which requires G1 7 G2. k
Proof of Lemma 1. Since the logic behind part (a) was outlined in the main text, here we
prove part (b). A redistribution of a secure resource from country j to country i(6= j) ex-
pands (contracts) the \recipient" (\donor") country's resource endowment. Dierentiating















for H = L;K. Since @2V i
A=(@Gi)2 < 0, we have sign[dBi
A=dHi] = sign[@2V i
A=@Gi@Hi].

















A=dLi > 0 whereas dBi
A=dKi < 0. The signs of these derivatives imply that a
32transfer of labor from one country to another increases (decreases) arms production by the
recipient (donor) for any given arms choice by the rival; yet, a transfer of land decreases
(increases) arms production by the recipient (donor). By the properties of best-response
functions and in particular the uniqueness of equilibrium (shown in the Supplementary
Appendix), if we start with an arbitrary secure endowment conguration in S0 and transfer
a small amount of labor from country j to country i or land from country i to country j,
we necessarily end up somewhere in Si where Gi
A > G
j






1, and by Lemma A.4 ki
X < k
j
X. Notice that this proof does not
require we obtain complete comparative statics results on equilibrium arming and applies
for all secure resource allocations in Si. k
Lemma A.6 (Transfers of Secure Resources) For initial factor distributions in S0, a
small transfer of a secure resource from country j to its adversary i (6= j) has the following
































dKi < (e p
A)r(e p
A):
Proof: To identify the eects of endowment changes on equilibrium security policies we


















































@G2@G1 > 0 denotes the determinant
of the Jacobian of the net marginal payos in (9) and all expressions are evaluated at the
equilibrium.34 Start with an endowment distribution in S0, so that Gi
A = e G
A and pi
A = e p
A























is identical for i = 1;2 (j 6= i) and strictly
positive, since by Lemma A.3(b) V 1
























is identical for i = 1;2 (j 6= i) and strictly
negative by Lemmas A.3(a), A.3(c) and A.4(b).
34That jJj > 0 is shown in the Supplementary Appendix.









































































@G2@K2 < 0 by (A.14) and the related
discussion.
Part (a): Consider a small transfer of labor from country 2 to country 1, so that  dL2 =


























Similar logic for land redistributions shows that dG1
A =dK1 =  dG2
A =dK1 < 0.
Part (b): Extend the decomposition of welfare eects in (8) to include the eect of changes
in the countries' secure holdings of resources. Focusing on labor redistributions, invoking















for i = 1;2 (j 6= i); (A.16)
where pi
A = e p
A for initial distributions in S0. Then, part (b) of the lemma is established
by invoking symmetry and applying part (a) of the lemma to (A.16) and an analogous
expression for the welfare eects of a change in land. k








as follows along its free trade best-response function, Bi


























(a) If Gi  Gj, then dki
X=dGjjGi=Bi
F(Gj) < 0;
(b) If Gi > Gj, then dki
X=dGjjGi=Bi
F(Gj) 6= 0 almost always.




GiGi. Furthermore, observe that country i's FOC (9) implies (i) riK0i
Gi =  i and
34(ii) riK0i
Gj =  ii
Gj=i
Gi. Then, these applications of (9) to (A.8) with (A.1){(A.4) and
the simplied expression for dBi
F=dGj gives (A.17). Parts (a) and (b) of the lemma follow
from (A.17), noting that the coecient outside the square brackets is positive. Inspection
of (A.17) shows further that dki
X=dGjjGi=Bi
F(Gj) < 0 not only where Gi  Gj, but also
where Gi > Gj, provided that i
LG is not too large relative to si
L. Since the expression in
square brackets is most likely to be positive when i = 1 which implies j = 0 and when
f00
i =f02
i = 0, a sucient (but not necessary) condition for this derivative to be negative even
when Gi > Gj, is that i
LG < 2si
L. k
Proof of Lemma 3.
Part (a): The result follows by the denition of i
A (which implies Mi
F (i
A) = 0) and the
observation that the strategic welfare eect|i.e., the second term in the RHS of (11)|is









1), there exists a suciently high (low)
price,  > i
A ( < i
A)), such that dG
j
F =d = 0 8 >  (8 < ). But then by (11) and
the denition of i
A, which implies Mi
F () 7 0 for  ? i





1), then dV i
F =d > 0 8   (dV i
F =d < 0 8  ).





minimizes country i's welfare while country i exports the land-intensive good. k
Proof of Proposition 4. Since we consider secure factor distributions in the AES subset
of S0, it will necessarily be the case that pi
A = e p
A for i = 1;2, and thus i
A = e p
A. For
clarity, suppose that ki
2 > ki




Part (a): By Lemma 3, there thus exists a price i0 > i
min, for i = 1;2, such that V i
F () <
e V i
A , 8 2 (e p
A;i0). Now dene 00 = minf10;20g. It follows that V i
F () < e V i
A for i = 1;2,
8 2 (e p
A;00).
Part (b): Starting at an arbitrary distribution in the AES subset of S0, transfer a small
quantity of labor from country 2 to country 1 (i.e.,  dL2 = dL1 > 0), so that the nal
distribution is in the AES subset of S1. Since in the case of free trade the strategic eect of
such transfers vanishes (there is no eect on equilibrium arming), a welfare decomposition
similar to that in (A.16) yields dV 1
F =dL1 =  dV 2
F =dL1 = ()w(). Thus, Lemma A.6(b)
implies that dV 1
F =dL1 < dV 1
A =dL1 and dV 2
F =dL1 > dV 2
A =dL1. Since  = e 
A implies
V i
F = V i
A initially, we will have V 1
F < V 1
A and V 2
F > V 2
A after the transfer. By
continuity, there exists additional labor transfers with the just described preferences over
35trade regimes. k
B Supplementary Appendix (not for publication)
Theorem B.1 An interior Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (security policies) exists un-
der autarky. Furthermore, the equilibrium is unique if the technology for arms is suciently
labor-intensive or the inputs to arms are not very close complements.
Proof:
Existence: We establish existence of equilibrium in pure strategies, by showing that every
country i's payo function V i
A is strictly quasi-concave in its strategy, Gi. To do so, it
is sucient to show either that V i
A is strictly monotonic in Gi or that V i
A is rst strictly
increasing and then strictly decreasing over the agent's strategy space.
Let F(Ki
G;Li
G) be the production function for guns that is dual to the unit cost func-
tion  (wi;ri) and dene G
i  F(Ki;Li) as the level of guns produced with the country's
entire secure endowments of land and labor. Country i's strategy space is [0;G
i]. For
any Gj 2 [0;G
j], if Gi = G
i, country i (6= j) will not be able to produce either of the
consumption goods; therefore, V i
A(G
i;Gj) < V i
A(Gi;Gj) for any Gi 2 [0;G
i) which implies
that, under autarky, no country will use all of its resources to produce arms. Further-
more, since limGi!0 f0(Gi) = 1 by assumption, we must have @V i
A=@Gi > 0 as Gi ! 0.
By the continuity of V i
A in Gi, there will exist a best response function for each country
i, Bi
A(Gj)  minfGi 2 (0;G
i) j @V i
A=@Gi = 0g, with the property that @V i
A=@Gi > 0
8Gi < Bi
A(Gj). Thus, to establish strict quasi-concavity of V i
A in Gi we need only to prove
that @V i
A=@Gi < 0, 8Gi > Bi
A(Gj).
Suppose, on the contrary, that @V i
A=@Gi  0. Since V i
A must eventually fall to V i
A(G
i;Gj),
this supposition implies that V i
A must attain a local minimum at some Gi > Bi(Gj), which
would imply that @2V i
A=(@Gi)2 > 0. We now establish that this is not possible. Recalling
that pi
A = pi
A(Gi;Gj) under autarky and that !i = !(pi), we dierentiate (9) with respect























By Lemma A.3(a), the rst term in the RHS of the above expression is negative regardless of
the ranking of factor intensities. Furthermore, by Lemmas A.3(c) and A.4(b), the product










36of the expressions in the second term will also be negative. It follows that @2V i
A=(@Gi)2 < 0
at any Gi where @V i
A=@Gi = 0 regardless of the ranking of factor intensities. This proves
Bi
A(Gj) is unique and establishes the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Uniqueness: Having already established that guns production is bounded (i.e., Bi
A(Gj) 2
(0;G
i) for i = 1;2 (j 6= i), we can now establish uniqueness of equilibrium by showing that,
at any equilibrium point, the determinant of the Jacobian of the net marginal payos in (9)












@G2@G1 > 0 (Kolstad and Mathiesen, 1987).
Consider an equilibrium point where G1
A = B1
A(G2
A ) and G2
A = B1
A(G1
A ). From the







, is less than 1 at (G1
A ;G2
A ), then jJj > 0,
implying that this equilibrium is unique. The slope of country i's best-response function













































A=(@Gi)2 < 0 as shown in (B.1), the sign of @Bi
A=@Gj is determined by the sign of
@2V i
A=@Gi@Gj shown in the numerator of (B.2). Now, by Lemmas A.3(c) and A.4(b), the
second term of the numerator of the RHS of this expression is always positive. By Lemma
A.3(b), the rst term in the numerator is positive if Bi
A(Gj) > Gj (also see equation
(A.11)), in which case Gi is a strategic complement for Gj. However, if Bi
A(Gj) < Gj,
then the rst term is negative. Thus, when Bi
A(Gj) is suciently smaller than Gj, Gi can
become a strategic substitute for Gj. Furthermore, since 1
G1G2 =  2
G2G1 (see (A.4)),














. Therefore, we have
two possibilities to consider. Either (i) @Bi
A=@Gj > 0 and @B
j
A=@Gi  0 for i = 1;2
(j 6= i); or, (ii) @Bi






< 1 and therefore jJj > 0. Turning to case (ii), we now establish






< 1 and thus
jJj > 0.37




























37Note that, in case (ii), jJj > 0 is also the condition for local stability of equilibrium.
37The above expressions together with (A.10), (A.11), and (A.12) can be substituted into
















































A; therefore, if  i
A 2 (0;1) for i = 1;2, then jJj > 0. In case (ii),
both the numerator and the denominator of  i
A are positive, so  i





Gj]. From (A.1){(A.4), i = Gi[f0
i=fi   f00
i =f0
i] > 0. Then,
subtracting the numerator of  i
A from its denominator while using the denition of i

























Clearly, a sucient condition for  i
A < 1 is that (B.4) is positive, which is almost always
true. In particular, since the rst term and the coecient in front of the second term
are unambiguously positive, a sucient (but hardly necessary) condition for  i










L)  0. This condition
is satised under a wide range of circumstances,38 including: (i) i
Gi  si
L, which requires
arms inputs not to be close complements; and (ii) i
LG  si
L (or, by (A.9), ki > ki
G),
which requires the guns sector to be suciently labor-intensive, regardless of the degree
of substitutability between inputs in arms. Either condition, along with the boundary
conditions established above, ensures uniqueness of equilibrium. k
Theorem B.2 If the world price, technology, the distribution of secure endowments and
the degree of land insecurity are such that (i) free trade in consumption goods leads to
international factor price equalization, and (ii) the production of arms does not exhaust
either country's secure land endowment, an interior pure strategy, Nash equilibrium in
security policies will exist, and will be unique and symmetric.
Proof: The proofs for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, which build on parts (a)
and (b) of Lemma A.3, are similar to those in the case of autarky (see above), and are
thus omitted here. See the main text for a discussion of the logic underlying the symmetry
results. k




; 8 2 (0;1]), then 
i
G = 1 and 
i = 1, thus implying that the sucient condition
simplies to 1   s
i
L  0, which is always satised.
38Proposition B.1 For an asymmetric distribution of secure resources in the AES subset of
Si given world prices in the neighborhood of pi
A, country i imports the land-intensive good
and is worse o under free trade.





assuming world prices in the neighborhood of p1





A holds (Lemma A.5). Now suppose, just for the sake of argument, that
both countries move to free trade, but face dierent world prices: 1 = p1
A and 2 = p2
A .
The resulting outcome is simply the autarkic equilibrium. To proceed, keep 1 = p1
A xed,
and suppose that 2 increases to 1 = p1
A . This increase in 2 induces country 2 to increase
its arms, which in turn induces country 1 to increase its arms. However, the increase in
country 1's arming will be proportionately less, so that in the free trade equilibrium arming
is equalized across countries: B2
F(G1
F;p1
A ) = B1
F(G2
F;p1
A ) > G1
A > G2
A . Assuming that
1
LG is not too large relative to s1
L so that dk1
X=dG2jG1=B1
F(G2) < 0 (see equation (A.17)),
1 = p1
A < 1
A and hence country 1's comparative advantage is distorted in this equilibrium:
M1
F(p1
A ) > 0.
Since a shift from autarky to free trade can be viewed as an exogenous change in the
eective price, the welfare eects of such a shift can generally be decomposed into the
terms of trade eect and the strategic welfare eect as shown in (11). Of course, 1 has
not changed in this experiment, implying the terms of trade eect on country 1's welfare is
zero. Thus, the eect of both countries' moving from autarky to free trade on country 1's
welfare at  = p1
A will be captured by the negative strategic welfare eect alone (i.e., the
second term in equation (11)) induced by the increase in 2. (Note that, while driven solely
by the strategic welfare eect, this adverse consequence for country 1's welfare reects the
distortion in country 1's comparative advantage at  = p1
A .)
A fall in the world price below p1
A induces both a terms of trade improvement and a
positive strategic eect for country 1, and thus causes an increase in country 1's welfare.
As such, there exists a world price less than p1
A , for which country 1's welfare under free
trade will be equal to that under free trade.
As  rises above p1
A approaching  = 1
A, both the terms of trade eect and the strategic
welfare eect for country 1 are negative. Further increases in  above 1
A continue to imply a
negative strategic welfare eect, but now also a positive terms of trade eect. Nevertheless,
for  suciently close to 1
A, the former eect will dominate. k
39Figure 1
Individually Optimal Security PoliciesFigure 2
Best-Response Functions in Security Policies